The War on the English: A Case Study in the Culture of Critique, Parts 1/2/3
May 27, 2011
Brenton Sanderson, The Occidental Observer


In the last fifty years the culture of critique has reengineered public discourse in the West so successfully that laudatory references to European ethnic groups, such as the English, are today widely held to be morally repugnant.  This reality is confirmed by the recent experience of Brian True-May, the co-creator of the internationally successful television series Midsomer Murders. One of most successful British cultural exports of the last decade, Midsomer Murders draws large audiences around the world – particularly in the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The long-running series is known for its quaint English village setting which provides the backdrop for classic (if clichéd) murder mysteries.

Brian True-May

The program made international headlines in March when True-May was suspended by ITV. Asked in an interview to account for the show’s international success, he said his winning formula was quite simple: keep it as English as possible. He pointed out that the series simply ‘wouldn’t work’ if there was any racial diversity portrayed in the sleepy village set in the fictional county of Midsomer. ‘We just don’t have ethnic minorities involved. Because it wouldn’t be the English village with them,’ he told the Radio Times. ‘It just wouldn’t work. Suddenly we might be in Slough … We’re the last bastion of Englishness and I want to keep it that way. Maybe I’m not politically correct … I’m trying to make something that appeals to a certain audience, which seems to succeed. And I don’t want to change it.’

Predictably enough, an ITV spokesman immediately issued a statement: ‘We are shocked and appalled at these personal comments by Brian True-May which are absolutely not shared by anyone at ITV. We are in urgent discussions with All3Media, the producer of Midsomer Murders, who have informed us that they have launched an immediate investigation into the matter and have suspended Mr True-May pending the outcome.’ ITV was captured by the Judeo-Marxist establishment long ago, and Jewish editorial control at ITV has been ensured for the next generation with the recent appointment of the 32-year-old Jonathan Levi as head of ITV’s arts and popular culture division. The situation at the BBC is little different.

Behind the suspension of True-May was a tacit threat: his program needs to modify a successful formula in the interests of promoting the multicultural ideal of Britain’s cultural-Marxist (and Jewish-dominated) intellectual establishment. This ‘last bastion of Englishness’ must cease, even if this means undermining the very basis of the program’s success. The apparent concern is not that Midsomer Murders is inaccurate in its portrayal of the typical rural English village – which, to the dismay of many, are still overwhelming white – but rather that the program constitutes, in some sense, a ‘celebration’ of this fact, and by extension, exploits a nostalgia and yearning for England as it was prior to mass Third World immigration and state-sponsored multiculturalism. This is anathema to an elite which is fiercely anti-White, has contempt for the White nation state, a profound dislike of any deference to White culture, and an incomprehension of the web of traditions and prejudices once revered by the English.

Observing the contemporary assault on the English, conservative philosopher Roger Scruton notes that ‘every practice in which the spirit of England can still be discerned seems fated now to arouse contempt.’[i] Unfortunately Scruton cannot see, or simply refuses to see, the Jewish elephant in the room as he attempts to account for this pernicious trend:

The forbidding of England is a strange phenomenon and one that is hard to explain. The country was always victorious in war, and was not impoverished even by the loss of its empire. No outside force compelled it to relinquish its national pride and culture. The process came from within, and seemingly without resistance. George Orwell commented on the disloyalty, the anti-patriotism and ‘intellectual sabotage’ that had helped to weaken England during the 1930s. He attributed the phenomenon to the fact that the old imperial society excluded the intellectuals, and therefore drove them to take up a negative posture towards it.[ii]

Roger Scruton

Scruton apparently fails to notice the pursuit of Jewish group interests manifest in the various intellectual movements that have formed the basis for what he terms the ‘culture of repudiation’ that subjected the old virtues, customs and religion of England ‘to humiliating scorn by the makers of public opinion.’[iii] He is correct, however, in observing that this ‘culture of repudiation’ found particularly fertile soil in the cultural landscape of post-war England.

[The] English emerged from two world wars in a condition of moral fatigue. … An overwhelming sense of guilt seemed to paralyse the country – guilt at its own successes, and an awareness of their cost. … Rather than risk the accusation that they were so bellicose and xenophobic as actually to believe in themselves, the English preferred to apologise.’ Therefore, one ‘of their most endearing traits became their nemesis. … The sneering and jeering at Old England was caused not by the country’s strength but by its manifest weakness, which means that it could be despised with impunity.[iv]

From a Native Culture of Dissent to the Culture of Critique

The English were particularly susceptible to being enlisted as vectors of the culture of critique given their psychological predisposition to individualism and moral universalism (a characteristic of northern Europeans generally, discussed by Kevin MacDonald here). This tendency is a theme that finds repeated expression through English history. Scruton observes that ‘the peculiarities of the English’ can be traced to what ‘is sometimes known as their “individualism” – that is, their disposition to affirm the right and responsibility of individual action in all spheres of social life.’[v] Their individualism was manifest in their national character:

The English, it is generally agreed, were distant, cool, reserved. They had friends, but they did not make them easily, and when they made them, they held them at a distance, embarrassed at the natural flow of human affection, and taking steps to avoid it whenever it might erupt. This reserve was part of loyalty; their affections were cool but steady. They deplored the volatile humours of the Mediterranean people, and the fickle sentimentality, as they saw it, of the Irish. Because their attachments were slow to form they were also slow to dissolve: for one attachment must be driven out by another, and meanwhile takes up its place with the same discreet informality as a member takes his armchair in his club. This reserve was observed not only between friends, but also between lovers, spouses and members of a family, where it could coexist with the deepest love and a mutual identification of aims and interests. It amounted not to a lack of feeling, but rather to a lack of self-regard – a refusal to display a feeling just because it happened to be yours.[vi]

The inherent individualism of the English led to the evolution of a nation of strangers. ‘Strangers do not live together by affection, by family sentiment, by swearing bonds of blood-brotherhood in the manner of the Arabian tribes. They live together by law, convention and a silent appeal to precedent. They settle disputes not by violent quarrels of vengeance, but by laying their grievance before an impartial judge, himself a stranger at one further remove.’[vii] The advent of the common law and devotion to the rule of law is regarded as the embodiment of the disposition of a people ‘who came to England from Jutland, Saxony and Scandinavia’ who ‘were distinguished by their litigiousness.’[viii] For Scruton, England has always been a land of dissent:

Important sections of English society have scorned its traditions, its compromises and its aristocratic ways, seeing only the bare bones of power and oppression and the hypocrisy that has kept these things in place. Lollards, Luddites, Puritans, Dissenters and Roundheads stood always in the wings of English society, moving centre stage in times of crisis. Chartists, trade unionists and republicans have relayed their dissenting message to the modern world.[ix]

That the modern culture of critique represents a profound discontinuity with this native tradition of dissent is revealed by the ‘undomesticated’ nature of the new form of dissent. Scruton points out that:

The English contained among their number a great many sneerers and scoffers: but they formed an accepted part of the organism, a chafing away from inside which created the comfortable impression that England itself was impregnable, since its quarrels were purely internal. … In their overseas adventures the English could be insolent and cruel. In Ireland and North America and sometimes in India, Englishmen behaved like despicable criminals. Yet they were schooled in self-criticism, and unwilling to excuse a crime, merely because it was theirs. The narrative of their crimes was itself written by Englishmen and their excesses were no sooner committed than condemned.[x]

The moral universalism and naive idealism of native English intellectuals, a legacy of their evolutionary development at northern hunter-gatherers, was doubtless intensified by the nation’s fortunate geography. Centuries of safety behind the shields of sea and navy created the illusion that the world is a much kinder place than it really is, and thus allowed the arguments of idealists to flourish. Thus, Kipling chided the naive pacifists of his time for ‘making mock of uniforms that guard you while you sleep.’

This was an apt criticism of the anti-patriotic Edwardian Fabians that made up the Bloomsbury Group, who included the type of intellectuals that, George Orwell noted, ‘are ashamed of their own nationality’ and who ‘felt there is something slightly disgraceful in being an Englishman and that it is a duty to snigger at every English institution.’ To a significant extent this was still true in 1965, but, with the intellectual force of the cultural of critique, this once atypical strand of thought and feeling broke out of its bookish little world to storm the cultural centres of the country, making, in the process,  traditional English patriotism deeply unfashionable.

Roy Jenkins: The face of British multiculturalism is a native Englishman

The Jewish intellectual class, and their non-Jewish dupes like Roy Jenkins, were thus able to draw upon a native tradition of dissent, and exploit it to unleash an orgy of altruistic punishment among the English. With the destruction and disruption of the Second World War, the austerity and chaos after that war and the manic suburbanisation of the country that came with the prosperity of the fifties and sixties, it was easier than ever for the English to be persuaded that significant parts of national existence should be altered forever. In an incredibly short time they turned England into a nation without heroes and without pride in its past. ‘All those features of the English character which had been praised in wartime books and films – gentleness, firmness, honesty, tolerance, ‘grit’, the stiff upper lip and the spirit of fair play – were either denied or derided. England was not the free, harmonious, law-abiding community celebrated in boys’ magazines, but a place of class divisions, jingoism and racial intolerance.’[xi]

While ostensibly unable to detect the aetiology of his ‘culture of repudiation’ Scruton aptly defines its conceptual outlines:

While exhorting us to be as ‘inclusive’ as we can, to discriminate neither in thought, word, nor deed against ethnic, sexual or behavioural minorities, political correctness encourages the denigration of what is felt to be especially ours. … The gentle advocacy of inclusion masks the far-from-gentle desire to exclude the old excluder: in other words to repudiate the cultural inheritance that defines us as something distinct from the rest. The ‘down with us’ mentality is devoted to rooting out old and unsustainable loyalties. And when the old loyalties die, so does the old form of membership. … We who live in the amorphous and multicultural environment of the postmodern city must open our hearts and minds to all cultures, and be wedded to none.[xii]

Into the vacuum left by the collapse of English self-confidence, a new ideological conformity has emerged. The new empire of ideas reaches into the most intimate areas of life, and those who do not accept it are held to be personally at fault, not just politically or philosophically wrong. It is the most fanatical system of thought to dominate the British Isles since the Reformation. Indeed, failure to conform to the new orthodoxy is held to be a moral failing and evidence of psychopathology. The effects of the culture of critique on English society have been so devastating that it is entirely fair to make an analogy with Mao Zedong’s Cultural Revolution in China. It has devalued objective knowledge and attempted to make many thoughts unthinkable, and has sundered many of the invisible bonds that once held English society together. The lore of the English tribe and the stories of their ancestors have largely ceased to be.

Meanwhile, under the banner of ‘social justice’ the ‘oppressed’ brown and black immigrant communities are given complete licence (and White taxpayer-funded assistance) to affirm their cultures and aggressively pursue their group interests. The crucial goal, with regard to the native English, is to ‘sever young people from historical loyalties‘ and instil ‘a “non-judgemental” attitude towards other cultures that goes hand-in-hand with a fierce denunciation of the culture that might had been one’s own.’[xiii] Young English people gain nothing from this culture save bewilderment and the loss of any sense of racial and cultural identity.

End of Part 1; Part 2 continued below


REFERENCES

Scruton, R. (2000) England: An Elegy, Chatto & Windus, London.
Scruton, R. (2002) The West and the Rest – Globalization and the Terrorist Threat, Continuum, London.

ENDNOTES

i Scruton, 2000, p. 247
ii Ibid. p. 248-249
iii Ibid. p. 249-250
ivIbid. p. 249-255
v Ibid. p. 10
vi Ibid. p. 48
vii Ibid. p. 54-55
viii Ibid. p. 9
ix Ibid. p. 18
x Ibid. p. 47
xi Ibid. p. 21
xii Scruton, 2002, p. 72-73
xiii Ibid. p. 81

Part 2The War on the English: A Case Study in the Culture of Critique, Part 2
May 29, 2011 — 76 Comments
Brenton Sanderson

Under the new cultural orthodoxy the traditional English virtues are rapidly disappearing. The effect of the culture of critique on a society whose values were all open to question and whose morals were dissolving was and continues to be explosive. Scruton observes that having been famous for their stoicism, their decorum, their honesty, their gentleness, and their sexual puritanism, the English now subsist in a society in which those qualities are no longer honoured – a society of people who regard long-term loyalties with cynicism, and whose response to misfortune is to look round for someone to sue. England is no longer a gentle country, and the old courtesies and decencies are disappearing. … Sex, freed from taboos, has become the ruling obsession: the English have the highest rate of divorce in Europe, regard marriage as a bore, are blatantly promiscuous and litter the country with their illegitimate, uncared for and state-subsidised offspring. … The loss of traditional virtue and local identity has occurred throughout Europe and its diaspora.[i]

The intellectual war against the traditional White family, a product of the culture of critique, is one which has had disastrous consequences for White group interests. Scruton notes that the assault on the family was part of a great cultural shift from the affirmation to the repudiation of inherited values:

Wilhelm Reich, R.D. Laing, Aaron Esterson, and radical psychotherapists of their persuasion see the family as a burden imposed by the past: a way in which parents encumber their offspring with an inheritance of defunct authority. Schizophrenia, in Laing’s view, arises because the Self is made Other by the parental imposition of dysfunctional norms.[ii]

Inevitably, these “dysfunctional norms” were the traditional family structure and regulative ideas of English society. Following the path laid out by these radical intellectuals and post-structuralists like Michel Foucault, ‘radical feminism has set out to deconstruct the family entirely, exposing it as an instrument of male domination, and advocating new kinds of “negotiated” union in its place.’ As Kevin MacDonald notes, this radical deconstruction of the traditional Western family structure was never accompanied by an analogous deconstruction and critique of the traditional Jewish family structure and its regulative ideas — particularly its inculcation of ethnocentrism and a bunker mentality of ‘us (good) against them (evil)’, not to mention its extreme emphasis on economic success and upward mobility.

Despite this ongoing assault on the traditional European family, there remains a section of society committed to ‘family values’ and to the division of roles that makes families durable. Nevertheless, this section of society does not have any real voice in the shaping of public opinion. The Judeo-Marxist elite have a virtual monopoly on the points of view found in the mainstream media.

As Scruton points out:

The message of the media, the academy, and the opinion forming elite is feminist, anti-patriarchal, and opposed to traditional sexual prohibitions such as those governing abortion, homosexuality, and sex outside marriage. More importantly, the culture of the elite has undergone a kind of ‘moral inversion’ to use Michael Polanyi’s idiom. Permission turns to prohibition, as the advocacy of alternatives gives way to a war against the former orthodox. The family, far from enjoying the status of a legitimate alternative to the various ‘transgressive’ postures lauded by the elite, is dismissed out of hand as a form of oppression. … Like Marxism, feminism purports to show us the world without ideological masks or camouflage. Its repudiating zeal is not, as a rule, directed against Islam or the cultures of the East. It is directed against the West, and its message is ‘down with us.’[iii]

The generations that came after the culture of critique have often come from families that have disintegrated or are weak, whose schools do not uphold tradition and racial pride, and whose religious experience and understanding are non-existent. They have instead grown up with immensely strong outside influences – almost all of them radical enemies of White people and their culture. Anyone who controls a major television network or movie studio (as our hostile Judeo-Marxist elite does) can use it to pour out propaganda which most young Whites find impossible to resist, provided it uses the right sort of codes, language and symbols. This media control has done infinitely more damage to the long-term group interests of the English people than anything the Luftwaffe managed to do to them during World War Two.

From Victorianism to the Culture of Critique

Jewish historian Norman Cantor observed that the Jewish intellectual movements, which he equated with ‘modernism,’ represented the negation of ‘Victorianism’. He notes that:

Something more profound and structural was involved in the Jewish role in the modernist revolution than this sociological phenomenon of the supersession of marginality. There was an ideological drive at work. … Victorianism liked to build on the heritage of the past. Modernism, assuming this heritage, wanted to put it aside and concentrate on what could be discovered anew in the laboratory, in the research library, in the psychiatric patient’s free association and sexual memory, in the application of colour to canvas, in words and sentences, in quantifiable social trends, in the anthropological fieldwork experience.  Their response was a fundamental re-examination of the postulates of European thought as it had existed in the nineteenth century. As new men, as recent outsiders, they had no personal stake or family participation in Victorianism or professional responsibility to it. They were not restrained by prior commitments from undertaking the zero-base reconsideration of physics, psychology, sociology, philosophy, anthropology, and the arts.[iv]

A central concern, in this endeavour, was to deconstruct the theoretical and cultural basis of English racial pride and ethnocentrism. This necessitated expunging a view that during the Victorian era was held by the English as natural and self-evident: that ‘When considering the human material from which English civilisation was made’, it was natural to ‘refer to the English race, this ‘happy breed of men’, whose offshore island was the guarantee of their racial purity and apartness.’ Scruton invites us to ponder what happens when a people live together on an island unconquered, as the English were unconquered during the centuries that made them:

There occurs a gradual homogenisation in appearance, in deportment and in temperament. A bodily rhythm is acquired and passed on. This rhythm becomes established as an almost physiological trait, recognisable at a glance to the foreigner in England, and to the Englishman abroad. In such a case it is not surprising to find our Victorian ancestors referring to the English race, to ‘kith and kin’, to the ‘island stock’, and so invoking, though idioms that are now widely disapproved, a perfectly normal and natural human fact. England was associated, in the minds of those who claimed it as their homeland, with a recognisable physical type, with its own varieties of male and female beauty. Paintings, photographs, poems, novels and descriptions show that this type existed in large numbers, before immigration and emigration began to alter it.[v]

To fatally weaken the instinct for racial preservation of the ‘island stock’, the culture of critique had to overcome a revulsion against miscegenation which was a longstanding feature of English life – a feature that reached its apogee in the late Victorian period, and which was a major source of their imperial strength. Scruton notes that

This fear of contamination is, paradoxically, what made the English into such intrepid adventurers and explorers. They could go anywhere, encounter anyone, suffer anything and emerge unpolluted. … The people among whom they wandered were essentially other, and interesting for that very reason. But since they were other, they did not belong with us. … The English made themselves especially offensive to the Indians by treating all of them, even the Brahmins, as though they were of a lower caste than themselves, and by allowing them to share their domestic lives only as servants and never as equals. The intricate connection between this attitude and the fear of sexual contamination is well brought out by Paul Scott, in his anti-English novels of the Raj. … Sexual puritanism is an attempt to safeguard possessions more valuable than pleasure. The good that it does outweighs the evil, and the English knew this.[vi]

This cultural feature found its leading expression in the Scottish surgeon, anatomist and anthropologist, Robert Knox, best known now as the chief client of the Edinburgh body-snatchers, Burke and Hare. His published works included The Races of Men (1850, revised 1862), in which he described ‘as simply a fact’ that ‘race in human affairs is everything: literature, science, art, in a word, civilisation, depend on it.’[vii] The highest races were the Germans, the Saxons, and the Celts; the lowest were the dark races of the Earth. He described the Jewish race as ‘sterile parasites.’

Though Knox’s work is now almost completely forgotten, it was widely admired at the time, by Charles Darwin among others, and exerted significant popular influence. Knox was pessimistic regarding British imperialism, partly because he held it to be a fruitless task (given that he believed the dark races were incapable of being civilized), but mainly because it could eventually lead to the degeneration of a superior race as a function of miscegenation.

Knox’s views were later given scientific foundation by the mathematician Francis Galton who, in his book Hereditary Genius (1869), pioneered the ideas that a ‘man’s natural abilities are derived by inheritance’; that ‘out of two varieties of any race of animal who are equally endowed in other respects, the most intelligent variety is sure to prevail in the battle for life’; and that on a sixteen-point scale of racial intelligence, a Negro is two grades below an Englishman.

A more systematic development was undertaken by Karl Pearson, another Cambridge-trained mathematician, who in 1911 became the first Galton Professor of Eugenics at University College London. Pearson became persuaded that his statistical techniques (which he called ’biometry’) could be used to demonstrate the dangers posed to the Empire by racial degeneration.[viii]

Meanwhile, as social identity theory would predict, the English racial type was idealised. Typical was the statement of Joseph Chamberlain who maintained: ‘I believe in this race, the greatest governing race the world has ever seen; in this Anglo-Saxon race, so proud, so tenacious, self-confident and determined, this race which neither climate nor change can degenerate, which will infallibly be the predominant force of future history and universal civilisation.’[ix]

A similar view was also expressed by one of the characters in Benjamin Disraeli’s novel Tancred (1847) who tells us that the historical success of England is an ‘affair of race. A Saxon race, protected by an insular position, has stamped its diligent and methodic character on the century. And when a superior race, with a superior idea of Work and Order, advances, its state will be progressive.’[x]

At the beginning of the twentieth century the English racial ideal was embodied in characters like Lord John Roxton in Arthur Conan Doyle’s The Lost World, with his ‘strange, twinkling, reckless eyes – eyes of a cold light blue, the colour of a glacier lake’.

He was the essence of the English country gentleman, the keen, alert, open-air lover of dogs and of horses. His skin was of a rich flower-pot red from sun and wind. His eyebrows were tufted and overhanging, which gave those naturally cold eyes an almost ferocious aspect, an impression which was increased by his strong and furrowed brow. In figure he was spare, but very strongly built – indeed, he had often proved that there were very few men in England capable of such sustained exertions.[xi]

The English were recognised not only by themselves but by visitors and travellers as a distinct human type. Indeed, some of the best descriptions were written by foreigners, as they endeavoured to understand the phenomenon of the Englishman. The Czech novelist Karel Capek wrote in 1925 that if you get to know them closer, they are very kind and gentle; they never speak much because they never speak about themselves. They enjoy themselves like children, but with the most solemn, leathery expression; they have lots of ingrained etiquette, but at the same time they are free-and-easy as young whelps. They are as hard as flint, incapable of adapting themselves, conservative, loyal, rather shallow and always uncommunicative; they cannot get out of their skin, but it is a solid, and in every respect excellent skin. You cannot speak to them without being invited to lunch or dinner; they are as hospitable as St Julian, but they can never overstep the distance between man and man. Sometimes you have a sense of uneasiness at feeling so solitary in the midst of these kind and courteous people; but if you were a little boy, you would know that you could trust them more than yourself, and you would be free and respected here more than anywhere else in the world; the policeman who would puff out his cheeks to make you laugh, an old gentleman would play at ball with you, a white-haired lady would lay aside her four-hundred page novel to gaze at you winsomely with her grey and still winsome eyes.[xii]

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana famously enumerated the qualities of the English as he perceived them in 1922, noting that:

Instinctively the Englishmen is no missionary, no conqueror. He prefers the country to the town, and home to foreign parts. He is rather glad and relieved if only natives will remain natives and strangers, and at a comfortable distance from himself. Yet outwardly he is most hospitable and accepts almost anybody for the time being; he travels and conquers without a settled design, because he has the instinct of exploration. His adventures are all external; they change him so little that he is not afraid of them. He carries his English weather in his heart wherever he goes, and it becomes a cool spot in the desert, and a steady and sane oracle amongst all the deliriums of mankind. Never since the days of Greece has the world has such a sweet, just, boyish master. It will be a black day for the human race when scientific blackguards, conspirators, churls and fanatics manage to supplant him.’[xiii]

For the English sons of British Empire there was certainly deep racial pride, though it was restrained by benevolence and a fair amount of modesty. Thus, Thomas Pickles, writing in 1932, could point out: ‘The almost worldwide domination of the White man does not mean that our way of life is the only right way, or that peoples of other races are necessarily inferior; indeed the study of geography shows us that “coloured” peoples have a great deal to contribute to the well-being of the world.’

End of Part 2 of 3. Part 3 continued below

REFERENCES

Cantor, N.E. (1994) The Sacred Chain – The History of the Jews, HarperCollins, New York.
Capek, K. (1927) Letters from England, Translated by Paul Selver, London.
Ferguson, N. (2003) Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin, England.
Freedland, J. (2005) Journey into the Heart of Belonging, Hamish Hamilton, London.
Hobson, J. (2004) The Eastern Origins of Western Civilisation, Cambridge University Press, UK.
Knox, R. (1850) The Races of Man, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, UK.
Pickles, T. (1932) Europe, J.M. Dent, London.
Santayana, G. (1922) ‘The British Character’ in Soliloquies in England and Later Soliloquies, London.
Schama, S. (2001) A History of Britain 1776-2000 – The Fate of Empire, BBC Worldwide, London.
Scruton, R. (2000) England: An Elegy, Chatto & Windus, London.
Scruton, R. (2002) The West and the Rest – Globalization and the Terrorist Threat, Continuum, London.
ENDNOTES
i Scruton, 2000, p. 245-246
ii Ibid. p. 70-71
iii Ibid. p. 71-72
iv Cantor, p. 303
v Scruton 2000, p. 76
vi Ibid. p. 50-51
vii Knox 1850, p. xi
viii Ferguson, 2003, p. 264
ix Chamberlain J. In Hobson p. 237
x Disraeli B. In Hobson, p. 237
xi Conan Doyle, A. In Ferguson, p. 265
xii Capek, 1925, p. 174-175
xiii Santayana, 1922, p. 32

Part 3

The New Orthodoxy

The post-cultural revolution environment is, of course, very different. As the Jewish historian Norman Cantor pointed out:

Since 1945 and more intensively since the 1960s all forms of racialist thinking are excluded from rational and enlightened discourse, especially in the United States, where the liberal civil libertarians have made racial doctrine intrinsically wrong, evil, and undiscussable. Modern anthropology, as defined the German-Jewish expatriate Franz Boas, for three decades head of the anthropology department at Columbia University, declared nineteenth-century race theory without foundation.’

Unlike many of his co-ethnics, Cantor is willing to admit that ‘this behavioural egalitarianism and universality was itself an ideology,’ and that ‘Whether mankind can be divided into biologically designated racial groups had been … excluded from civil discourse.’

Even more remarkably, Cantor had the intellectual honesty to admit that:

Furthermore, racism is itself a central doctrine in traditional Judaism and Jewish cultural history. The Hebrew Bible is blatantly racist, with all the talk about the seed of Abraham, the chosen people, and Israel as a light to the other nations. Orthodox Jews in their morning prayers still thank God daily that he did not make Jews ‘like the other peoples of the earth.’ If this isn’t racism, what is? That highly regarded medieval book, Judah Halevi’s Kuzari, is blatantly racist. Halevi will not even allow that a convert to Judaism is the equal of a natural-born Jew. Martin Buber, the much-praised theologian and mystic, was still talking in the early 1920s about the distinctiveness of Jewish ‘blood’. Early Zionism was greatly affected by a positive view of racism. Herzl was inclined that way, and his close associate Max Nordau, for two decades a prominent Zionist leader in Europe, was the author of a classic of racist theory, Degeneration.

From about 1830 to 1900 Jews in Western Europe, especially in Britain, benefited rather than suffered from racist attitudes. Jews of Sephardi origin, if they were affluent, were regarded in aristocratic circles as esoteric creatures possessing superior bloodlines, and intermarriage with a converted Jew was entirely permissible in the best social and political circles. The behaviour of the British Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli is an example of this attitude. Far from trying to play down his Jewish ethnicity, Disraeli, the shrewdest of politicians emphasized it by turning up in Parliament in a hairdo and clothes that fit the racial stereotype of a Mediterranean Jew. [i]

Racial theory only became unpopular among Jews when their group interests were threatened by the emergence of a variant ‘of hierarchic Social Darwinism, which had wide acceptance as a legitimate sociology between 1880 and 1920. Darwin’s population biology was regarded in the late nineteenth century as scientifically verifiable. … It was popular in Britain as sustaining [what Cantor describes as] the myth of the White man’s burdensome privilege of ruling over the coloured races’[ii] However, the key rationale for the emergence of Boasian anthropology as a Jewish intellectual movement was the fact that ‘In the 1890s Social Darwinists, including some in universities, began to turn out hierarchic tables in which Jews were placed near the bottom of the list of races, just above blacks. If universalist multiculturalist equality rather than Social Darwinism had been fashionable, this particular pseudo-scientific polemic against the Jews would not have been possible, of course.’[iii]

It is hardly surprising in such an intellectual environment that Jews would resort to embracing ‘a cultural pluralism that removed the claim for the superiority of one culture over another’ and which essentially ‘protected the Jews from Christian and anti-Semitic claims that Judaism was an inferior religion.’ Support among Jewish intellectuals for Boasian anthropology really gained momentum as the expanding and prosperous Jewish communities in the West ‘suffered a severe check in the 1920s and 1930s from anti-Semitic discrimination and the closing of opportunity, particularly with regard to open access to the learned professions.’[iv]

From this point it became abundantly clear that White ethnocentrism and group cohesion was antithetical to Jewish group interests. This applied with particular strength to the English, who despite their common law tradition and strong inherited tendency to individualism, ‘retained a firm dedication to groupthink, sensitivity to collective social action, and identification of Jews as a distinct minority even if they had been emancipated to receive individually civil and political rights. Some English Gentiles were anti-Semitic,’ writes Cantor, ‘but even those who were not were highly conscious of Jews as a distinct group with identifiable behavioural characteristics.’[v]

Moreover, pre-WWII England is held in the historical memory of Jews to be a society riven with anti-Semitism.  For instance, Cantor writes that ‘the thick anti-Semitism of the time, spreading slowly upwards from the Gentile lower classes, who competed with immigrant Jews, to the ruling classes, was pervasive and bitter. There were severe limitations on the entry of Jews to the better private schools, to Oxford and Cambridge colleges, and to the learned professions. The Jews were made to feel alien and unwanted.’[vi] He also claims that the British government ‘was deeply concerned that Christian young men conscripted to fight in the war were not perceived as being sacrificed for the Jews. In addition to this general caution, high officials in the foreign and defence ministries were personally and openly anti-Semitic.’[vii]

As for Winston Churchill, he ‘was a highly intelligent man and something of a personal philo-Semite,’ but in the end he did ‘not raise a finger for the Holocaust-threatened Jews’ because ‘he was hypersensitive to the depth of anti-Semitism in his society and haunted by a fear that special efforts to save the Jews would raise cries of “it is a Jew’s war” and ‘British Christian boys are dying to save the rotten Jews.” He backed off completely.’[viii] Meanwhile, the Jewish community in Britain ‘that could have intervened to help Eastern European Jewry were inhibited and distracted by the wall of hate in their own ambience.’[ix] England itself was a land of painful memories for British Jewry with Guardian columnist Jonathan Freedland pointing out that: ‘Even the map of his own country was pockmarked with the sites of medieval Jewish torment: Lincoln, Norwich, York.’[x]

The fact that the English sacrificed a generation of its young men to fight Hitler means little to the Jewish intellectual class and its non-Jewish allies. Western civilisation then, like now, was regarded by activist Jews as an undifferentiated and pathological whole ripe for radical deconstruction. Today, all Europeans are held by the Jewish elite to be proto-Nazis and guilty of the Holocaust, with any hint of White ethnocentrism and group cohesion regarded as a recrudescence of National Socialism, and therefore a deadly threat to the prospect for Jewish group continuity. For a very large subset of ethnocentric Jewish intellectuals, Auschwitz is the culmination of Western culture, and the English are as culpable as any for spreading this immoral culture to large parts of the world. In this lies the underlying rationale for the post-World War II Jewish assault on the English.

Unsurprisingly, for the Jewish historian Simon Schama, what this ‘post-imperial Britain has going for it is precisely its resistance to the chilly White purism of Euro-nationalism.’ Schama glories in the revolution in values wrought by the culture of critique, a revolution that has made ‘something positive, a fresh Britain, out of its memories…,’ and where ‘instead of listening to the paranoid rant of an Enoch Powell prophesying that a multi-racial Britain would end like Rome with the ‘River Tiber foaming with blood’, a multi-racial Britain actually took pride in what Colin MacInnes, the ‘rebel’ writer of the 1950s, called even then its “mongrel glory”?’[xi] Nobody will be surprised to hear that Schama has never expressed a similar hope for a racially-mixed Israel.

Instead Schama gleefully recounts statistics that confirmed that even a decade ago, the English people were well on track to doing away with themselves as a biological entity. ‘More important for a multi-coloured British future,’ he notes, ‘a 1997 opinion poll found that 50 percent of British-born Caribbean men and 20 per cent of British-born Asian men had, or once had, White partners. In 2000 Yasmin Alibhai-Brown found that, when polled, 88 per cent of White Britons between the ages of 18 and 30 had no objection to inter-racial marriage; 84 per cent of West Indians and East Asians and 50 per cent of those from Indian, Pakistani or Bangladeshi background felt the same way.’[xii]

Last year we learnt that, based in current demographic trends, Britain is destined for a White minority by 2066 – the one thousandth anniversary of the Norman Conquest. The trend has been greatly accelerated in the past decade under a Labour government where the huge increase in migrants was the result of an attempt by certain Labour ministers to radically change the country and ‘rub the Right’s nose in diversity.’ The revelation that former Home Secretary Jack Straw (a leading member of Britain’s hostile Jewish elite) was the ideological driving force behind a strategy to flood Britain with mass Third-World immigration was hardly surprising given his professed enmity for the English people, whom he once declared had a ‘propensity for aggression and violence’ which they used to subjugate others. Of course the reality in England today is quite the reverse – that, as a result of the massive influx of low-IQ Third World immigrants, Whites are increasingly the targets for non-White aggression and violence.

The intellectual, political and social assault on the English people is paradigmatic of the damage that has been wrought on White people generally by the socially transformative effects of the culture of critique. The English have largely abandoned the regulative ideas of their traditional society, and have been encouraged, pressured, and legally obligated to embrace a set of ideas contrary to their group evolutionary interests. It is only in exposing the self-interested ethnic agenda running through this war on the English, and on the White race generally, that we can hope to liberate White people from the psychological grip of the ‘new orthodoxy,’ and allow them to once again unashamedly pursue their group interests as they did during the Victorian era.
 
REFERENCES

Cantor, N.E. (1994) The Sacred Chain – The History of the Jews, HarperCollins, New York.
Freedland, J. (2005) Journey into the Heart of Belonging, Hamish Hamilton, London.
Schama, S. (2001) A History of Britain 1776-2000 – The Fate of Empire, BBC Worldwide, London.
i Cantor, p. 336
ii Ibid. p. 337
iii Ibid. p. 337
iv Ibid. p. 308
v Ibid. p. 316
vi Ibid. p. 360
vii Ibid. p. 361
viii Ibid. p. 361-362
ix Ibid. p. 349
x Freedland p. 9
xi Schama, p. 550
xii Ibid. p. 551